Introduction
This paper will consider some of the challenges Australian courts and the Australian Trade Marks
Office have faced over the last couple of years when dealing with descriptive and laudatory word marks in the context of trade mark registration and cancellation proceedings. Descriptive and laudatory word marks tend to receive less attention than more exotic subject matter (such as colour, shape and product design marks), but the majority of decisions under the 'distinctiveness' ground that there are a number of problems with the current approaches to dealing with descriptive and laudatory marks, in relation to assessing both inherent adaptation to distinguish and factual distinctiveness. In Part 6 I make some recommendations for legislative reform, as well as suggesting what brand owners might do to overcome some of the challenges they are likely to face in seeking to secure protection for descriptive or laudatory word marks. that trade mark monopolies are unlikely to distort competition in the marketplace. 8 If a solely consumer-based understanding of the distinctiveness test were to be prioritised, this would logically seem to favour a less restrictive approach towards the legal tests for trade mark distinctiveness.
Importantly, if both the interests of consumers and competing traders in a market are to be taken into account, this raises questions as to how such interests are to be given effect (in particular, at what stages of the distinctiveness enquiry), as well as how the relationship between the interests is to be ordered and managed. In many jurisdictions there remains something of a tension between these policy factors, and Australia is no exception.
In addition to the problems inherent in designing a satisfactory test of distinctiveness, in
Australia the problem is compounded by the fact that s 41 of the Trade Marks Act, the key provision dealing with distinctiveness, is obscurely worded and presents a number of difficulties of interpretation. Unfortunately, this is true both of this provision as originally enacted and after its recent redrafting.
Section 41, the 'distinctive character' continuum and the two-step process
In short, s 41 contemplates that a mark may be accepted for registration on the basis of prima facie distinctiveness or a showing of factual distinctiveness. The provision relies on language and concepts derived from previous UK and Australian Acts, but is differently structured from the distinctiveness provisions under former legislation. 9 Thus, while cases on distinctiveness decided under old Acts are often highly instructive, the different legislative context in which those decisions were made must always be taken into account. for registration was made before 15 April 2013. 12 The following, detailed analysis of the operation of s 41, while intended primarily for those unfamiliar with the operation of the provision, introduces language and concepts that are not commonly referred to in the case law and decisions on the topic, and which will be used throughout the paper.
The relevant subsections of the former (ie, pre-15 April 2013) s 41 provided:
(2) An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.
(3) In deciding the question whether or not a trade mark is capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons, the Registrar must first take into account the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.
(4) Then, if the Registrar is still unable to decide the question, the following provisions apply.
(5) If the Registrar finds that the trade mark is to some extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons but is unable to decide, on that basis alone, that the trade mark is capable of so distinguishing the designated goods or services:
(a) the Registrar is to consider whether, because of the combined effect of the following:
(i) the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services;
(ii) the use, or intended use, of the trade mark by the applicant;
(iii) any other circumstances; the trade mark does or will distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant; and (b) if the Registrar is then satisfied that the trade mark does or will so distinguish the designated goods or services-the trade mark is taken to be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and (c) if the Registrar is not satisfied that the trade mark does or will so distinguish the designated goods or services-the trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.
(6) If the Registrar finds that the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons, the following provisions apply:
(a) if the applicant establishes that, because of the extent to which the applicant has used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application, it does distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant-the trade mark is taken to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;
(b) in any other case-the trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons.
The current s 41 relevantly provides:
(1) An application for the registration of a trade mark must be rejected if the trade mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is sought to be registered (the designated goods or services) from the goods or services of other persons.
(2) A trade mark is taken not to be capable of distinguishing the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons only if either subsection (3) or (4) applies to the trade mark.
(3) This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a) the trade mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and (b) the applicant has not used the trade mark before the filing date in respect of the application to such an extent that the trade mark does in fact distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant.
(4) This subsection applies to a trade mark if:
(a) the trade mark is, to some extent, but not sufficiently, inherently adapted to distinguish the designated goods or services from the goods or services of other persons; and (b) the trade mark does not and will not distinguish the designated goods or services as being those of the applicant having regard to the combined effect of the following:
(i) the extent to which the trade mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the goods or services from the goods or services of other persons;
(iii) any other circumstances.
The current subsection (1) is the same as the former subsection (2). The differences between the two versions of s 41 relate only to the remaining subsections. However, while the current s 41(2)-(4) is structured differently from the former s 41(3)-(6), and requires decision-makers to ask a newly framed set of questions, the two versions of s 41 are remarkably similar in terms of their practical operation.
Both the current s 41(1) and the former s 41(2) set out the actual ground of rejection: that the application for registration must be rejected if the mark is not capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services from those of other traders (that is, that it is not distinctive). The remaining subsections set out a code, or a two-step process, by which the enquiry is to be undertaken.
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(a) The first step: locating marks on the continuum
Under both versions of s 41, the first step in this process is to identify where along the continuum of distinctive character the mark falls, and to classify the mark in one of three ways. The first possibility is that the mark is not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods and services from those of other traders. Note 1 to the current s 41(4)/former 41(6), which has no legislative force but has been said to reflect the 'trend of judicial authority' under former legislation, 14 states that:
Trade marks that are not inherently adapted to distinguish goods or services are mostly trade marks that consist wholly of a sign that is ordinarily used to indicate:
(a) the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or some other characteristic, of goods or services; or (b) the time of production of goods or of the rendering of services.
For shorthand, in this paper I will call marks that are 'not to any extent inherently adapted' to distinguish the applicant's goods and services 'NTAEIA' marks. The second possibility is that the mark has some degree of inherent adaptation to distinguish the applicant's goods and services, but
is not sufficiently inherently adapted for it to be considered to be capable of distinguishing on that basis alone. These are marks that are in the 'problematic' part of the continuum of distinctive character but, because they have some degree of inherent adaptation to distinguish, are not quite in the realm of generic or entirely descriptive marks. I call these 'not sufficiently inherently adapted' marks 'NSIA' marks. The third possibility is that the mark is inherently adapted to distinguish the applicant's goods or services to such an extent that it is capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or services on that basis alone-that is, the mark is prima facie distinctive, falling in the unproblematic area of the continuum. Under the former s 41(3)-(4), the first step required the examiner to see if it could decide the question of whether or not the mark was capable of distinguishing, taking into account only the mark's degree of inherent adaptation to distinguish. In order for the ground of rejection in the former s 41(2) not to apply, this required the examiner to come to a conclusion that the mark was prima facie distinctive. The effect of the 'presumption of registrability' in s 33 was that this conclusion had to be reached unless the decision maker was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the mark was not prima facie distinctive. 15 If the decision maker was unable to reach this conclusion, it was then required to consider either s 41(5) (for NSIA marks) or s 41(6) (for NTAEIA marks) to determine whether or not the mark was capable of distinguishing. Under the current s 41, the first step is framed in more negative terms. Section 41(2) operates as a deeming provision: a mark is to be taken not to be capable of distinguishing only if it is an NSIA mark (see s 41(4)(a)) or an NTAEIA mark (see s 41(3)(a)). This requires the examiner to ask first whether, on the balance of probabilities, the mark is an NTAEIA mark or an NSIA mark. If not (meaning that it is, by exclusion, a prima facie distinctive mark), the mark is not caught by s 41(2), and cannot be rejected under s 41(1).
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In short, because the first step under both versions of s 41 requires the classification of the mark on the continuum of distinctive character, and because the 'presumption of registrability' applies equally in both cases, there is no practical difference between the two approaches. Both are designed to identify prima facie distinctive marks, which pass the s 41 hurdle, or NSIA/NTEAIA marks, for which an assessment of acquired distinctiveness is needed.
(b) The second step (if necessary): factual distinctiveness
The second step in the distinctiveness enquiry applies if it has been decided that the mark is either NSIA or NTAEIA. In essence, this step looks to whether or not such marks are capable of distinguishing as a result of factual distinctiveness. Under the former s 41(5)(a) the examiner was required ultimately to consider whether, as at the filing date, the mark did or would distinguish the specified goods or services as being those of the applicant-that is, whether the mark had acquired distinctiveness, or whether it would become factually distinctive. If the examiner was so satisfied, the mark was to be 'taken to be capable of distinguishing' for the purposes of s 41(2). If the examiner was not so satisfied, the converse applied, and the application had to be rejected. The effect of the current s 41(4)(b) is that the examiner has to be satisfied as to the opposite of this. That is, it now has to be satisfied that, as at the filing date, the mark has not acquired distinctiveness, or that it will not become factually distinctive, for the mark to be taken not to be capable of distinguishing for the purposes of s 41(2), and thus for the application to be rejected under s 41(1).
For NTAEIA marks, the applicant needed under the former s 41(6)(a), and needs under the current s 41(3)(b), to put forward evidence to show that because of the extent of its or a predecessor in title's pre-filing-date 19 use, the mark had acquired distinctiveness by the filing date. Under the former law, if the applicant was able to establish this to the examiner's satisfaction, the mark was to be taken to be capable of distinguishing for the purposes of 41(2); if not, the application had to be rejected. Under the current law, again, the examiner needs to be satisfied as to the opposite of this.
It is only if the examiner is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the mark had not acquired distinctiveness by the filing date that the mark is to be taken not to be capable of distinguishing for the purposes of s 41(2), meaning that the ground of rejection in (1) applies.
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(c) Summation
Despite its recent repeal and re-enactment, the current version of s 41 is likely to operate in an almost identical way to the former version. The difference between the former s 41(5)- (6) 20 Importantly, one effect of the current s 41(3)/former s 41(6) is that there is no longer a requirement, as was found to exist under previous Anglo-Australian legislation, of 'distinctiveness in law'. This requirement meant that some marks were treated as being so lacking in distinctive character that they were impossible to register. In contrast, there is now no absolute bar on registration; everything will depend on the applicant's evidence of acquired distinctiveness.
current s 41(3)-(4) relates only to the application of the 'presumption of registrability'. I discuss this in more detail in Part 5 below; for now, it is enough to note that the difference between the former and the new standard ought to be of very minor practical significance.
A more significant point is that s 41 remains an extraordinarily complex and difficult to navigate provision, even for those familiar with Australian trade mark law. It also relies on a tripartite classification structure-that is, requiring an assessment of whether the mark is NTAEIA, NSIA or prima facie distinctive-the precise rationale for which is not clear, and which is not reflected in the distinctiveness provisions in other jurisdictions, such as the EU and New Zealand.
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The distinction required to be drawn between NSIA and NTAEIA marks also means that s 41 can operate strangely in proceedings to cancel the registration of a mark on the ground of lack of distinctiveness. I return to these issues in Part 6. Cantarella litigation is discussed in some detail, rather than seeking to make a prediction as to the outcome of the case I will instead focus on some of the issues thrown up by this and other cases and decisions, to shed light on some of the difficulties involved in interpreting and applying s 41.
(a)
The current test and the issues at stake in Cantarella
To reiterate, the first step in considering s 41 (in either its former or current guise) is to determine where along the continuum of distinctive character the mark falls. This involves an assessment of the extent of the mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish the applicant's goods or services.
Exactly how this assessment is to be made is currently under consideration by the High Court was required to consider whether MICHIGAN for heavy earth-moving machines was 'adapted to distinguish' the applicant's goods under the 1955 Act. This consideration of the mark's 'adaptation to distinguish', in turn, involved an assessment of the extent to which the mark was 'inherently adapted so to distinguish' the applicant's goods, as well as whether it did so distinguish as a result of the applicant's use. 23 Referring to earlier House of Lords authority, 24 Kitto J held that 'adaptation to distinguish', but here referring only to inherent adaptation to distinguish, is to:
be tested by reference to the likelihood that other persons, trading in goods of the relevant kind and being actuated only by proper motives-in the exercise, that is to say, of the common right of the public to make honest use of words forming part of the common heritage, for the sake of the signification which they ordinarily possess-will think of the word and want to use it in connexion with similar goods in any manner which would infringe a registered trade mark granted in respect of it.
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As a geographically descriptive word that other traders in similar goods would wish to use to describe the provenance of their goods, MICHIGAN was held not to be inherently adapted to The issue that has come to be at the heart of the Cantarella litigation is whether a first step in the application of the distinctiveness test, as articulated in Clark Equipment, involves a consideration of the 'ordinary signification' of the mark. More specifically, it is whether, if the mark is considered to have no 'ordinary signification' to consumers of the specified goods or services, it can be considered to be prima facie distinctive, in effect answering the question of whether or not there is any likelihood of other traders thinking of the word and wanting to use it in connection with their own goods or services.
The key facts of the case are that Cantarella registered two word marks, both for coffee: ORO, Taking into account the laudatory meanings of 'oro' and 'cinque stelle' when translated from Italian to English, the fact that in Australia coffee is commonly associated with Italy, the number of people in Australia who speak or have some knowledge of Italian, and that both 'oro' and 'cinque stelle' had been used by other traders in Australia 'as words descriptive of the quality of the coffee products … for a significant period of time extending well before Cantarella's registration of its marks and afterwards', 31 the Full Court found the two marks to lack any inherent adaptation to distinguish (that is, to be NTAEIA marks).
The Cantarella appeal to the High Court raises difficult questions not only about the weight to be given to the 'ordinary signification' of the mark in the test for inherent adaptation to distinguish 32 but also about how the meaning of a sign is to be determined for the purposes of the distinctiveness inquiry. This latter question (which has importance beyond cases involving foreign words which, when translated into English, have laudatory or descriptive meanings) is particularly challenging. This is because there is no straightforward way of assessing 'signification'. For example, is it enough for a word to be assessed by reference to English dictionary definitions, or whether a majority of the buying public in Australia would understand the work to have a particular meaning in relation to the specified goods or services? Or is signification determined by looking to a range of factors, including the nature of the traders in the market for the specified goods or services, the composition of the buying public for those specified goods or services, and the knowledge base of those consumers-an approach that might give more weight to the fact that a term is understood to have a descriptive meaning amongst only a relatively small group, and which might involve de-emphasising dictionary definitions or evidence that the word is not 'commonly' or More fundamentally, the case seems to raise an even larger tension within the law of distinctiveness. This is whether the distinctiveness test has a trade regulation function, which prioritises the need to keep certain signs free for use by existing and future competitors in a market, or whether its function is to facilitate the registration of signs that would be understood by consumers as operating as badges of origin rather than mere product descriptors. The 'negative'
Clark Equipment test, quoted above, seems to suggest the former function. But what is often overlooked in Clark Equipment is that Kitto J also held that the overarching question in assessing adaptation to distinguish is whether the mark 'is such that by its use the applicant is likely to attain his object of thereby distinguishing his goods from the goods of others'. 38 This statement could be interpreted as also setting up a general 'positive' test that prioritises consumer understandings of the term and whether, if applied to the specified goods or services, the term would immediately do the job of distinguishing the trader's goods or services from those of others.
In many cases, the negative and the positive tests will lead to the same result: a mark that other traders would desire to use is one that would not be recognised as serving an origin-indicating function. However, this is not always the case. Consumers might arguably immediately recognise as a trade mark (for example, because of a misspelling or an unusual syntactical juxtaposition of otherwise descriptive words, or in the case of a person's name) a sign that is similar to a sign that other traders would legitimately wish to use for the sake of its ordinary signification. 39 They might do so because the trader is the only provider of the goods or services, for example because it has a temporary monopoly, granted by another statute, over the provision of goods under that name. 40 
(b) Applying Clark Equipment to assess the extent of a mark's 'inherent adaptation to distinguish
In the Cantarella litigation the first instance judge held the marks in question to be prima facie distinctive, while the Full Court held that not only were the marks not prima facie distinctive, they
were not to any extent inherently adapted to distinguish Cantarella's goods. This is interesting because it raises a more general question as to how the courts are going about assessing the extent of a mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish. In turn, this raises the issue of the precise relationship between the statutory test under s 41 and the case law used in assessing distinctiveness.
As explained above, applying s 41 first involves assessing the extent, if any, of a mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish, to arrive at one of three conclusions: (A) the mark is inherently adapted to such an extent that it is prima facie distinctive; (B) the mark is inherently adapted to some extent, but not enough for it to be prima facie distinctive; or (C) the mark is not to any extent inherently adapted. The difficulty is that Kitto J's test for 'inherent adaptation to distinguish' in Clark Equipment does not easily map on to the tripartite structure of s 41. There is a danger of the test being used to ask the binary question 'is the mark inherently adapted to distinguish?'
(sometimes expressed as 'does the mark have an inherent capacity to distinguish?' or 'is the mark 'inherently distinctive?'). The problem is that this will not necessarily provide a complete answer to the first step under s 41.
To explain, Clark Equipment sets up a test of the likelihood of traders engaging in a particular way. If it can be said that there is no or, at best, a negligible likelihood or possibility that other providers of the specified goods or services might wish to use the applicant's sign for the sake of its ordinary signification in relation to such goods or services, that will mean that the mark is not only inherently adapted to distinguish, but is inherently adapted to such an extent that it is distinctive on that basis alone-that is, that the mark is prima facie distinctive. 44 distinctive mark has a slight degree of inherent adaptation to distinguish (ie, it is an NSIA mark) or none at all (ie, it is an NTAEIA mark), which will impact on the sort of evidence of factual distinctiveness that the applicant will need to provide to ensure that the application is not rejected.
An exemplary approach to assessing the extent of a mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish was taken by Kenny J in her 2010 decision in Sports Warehouse Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd.
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It is vital to appreciate that the Clark Equipment test does not purport to set up bright line rules for determining when a mark will be prima facie distinctive as distinct from being an NSIA mark, or when it will have the slight degree of inherent adaptation to distinguish such that it falls to be considered as an NSIA mark rather than an NTAEIA mark. The test forces tribunals to make hard, often speculative, decisions about the conduct of traders in particular markets in assessing the likelihood that they would wish to use particular signs. The 'tripartite' classification method used in s 41 also raises the prospect that borderline cases will arise at two separate junctures-a problem to which I return when considering how s 41 could be usefully reformed.
However, the most important point for present purposes is that Clark Equipment has to be applied carefully to ensure that the question of the extent of a mark's inherent adaptation is not marginalised. There is a danger of it being applied in a manner that pushes decision-makers into a finding that the mark is either prima facie distinctive or to no extent inherently adapted to distinguish. This is a false dichotomy. One way of avoiding this is for decision-makers to avoid the imprecise use of terms such as 'inherently distinctive' and 'inherent capacity to distinguish'. This is because such terms are not always used in the same way in the case law and commentary on s 41; they can sometimes be used in a manner that glosses over the precise questions being asked by s 41 48 and, in particular, the requirement that the mark be classified on the continuum in one of three ways. A careful application of Clark Equipment might also help deal with difficult fact situations, such as those involving foreign marks which are laudatory or descriptive in translation, with greater nuance. Issues such as the extent of familiarity with the word in question, its meaning in both the foreign language and in translation, the nature of the goods and services, and the extent to which they are targeted at consumers can all be taken into account in an assessment of the degree of likelihood that other traders might wish to use the marks in question, which might then impact on a finding of the extent of the mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish. in a 2012 decision involving an application for SLEEPTEA, the hearing officer acknowledged that 'sleep tea' was a known type of tea but, given that the term was not commonly used, considered the mark to be NSIA, 100 a decision that sits uncomfortably alongside Eutectic.
By way of contrast, in the three court decisions in which the marks in question were held to be NTAEIA, the Office had, at the registration stage, classified the marks as NSIA. In Yarra Valley
Dairy Pty Ltd v Lemnos Foods Pty Ltd, involving PERSIAN FETTA for dairy products including
cheese, Middleton J held that even though 'Persia' is not the current name of a geographical area, its ongoing geographical significance is such that other traders would have a legitimate interest in wanting to describing their Iranian-sourced cheese, or a style of cheese derived from cheese produced in Iran, by reference to such a term, in particular because of the exotic connotations of the word 'Persia' and also to avoid any potentially negative association with 'Iran'. 101 In Agapitos v
Habibi, Le Miere J disagreed with the owner's submission that DENTAL EXCELLENCE for 'dentistry' was 'concocted', consisting of words that would not normally be used together, instead finding that other dentists wishing to indicate their services were of superior quality may well want to use the expression 'dental excellence' for that purpose. and one that other traders would wish to use in relation to print and online phone directories (emphasising evidence that before the filing date other traders in Australia and overseas had used the colour and word yellow in respect of their directories to indicate the purpose of them). 103 His
Honour was unpersuaded by Telstra's arguments that the word 'yellow' was not a generic term for business directories and was an 'arbitrary' term when used in relation to services. In all three cases, the judges were sceptical of the owners' arguments that their marks were inherently adapted to distinguish to even a slight extent. It remains to be seen whether the more cautious approach to the distinctiveness inquiry in these cases (the latter two in particular) influences the Office in its application of the first step of the distinctiveness inquiry.
As a final point, it is worth flagging that it is not obvious why, at a normative level, Australian law requires non-prima facie distinctive marks to be classified in one of two ways (ie, as NSIA or NTAEIA), and draws such a rigid demarcation between the two. After considering the significance of marks being classified in these ways in Part 5, in Part 6 I take up this question in more detail, arguing that there is a strong case for s 41 to be reformed to do away with the distinction between NSIA and NTAEIA marks entirely.
Factual distinctiveness (a) Challenges in demonstrating factual distinctiveness
As explained in Part 2, a non-prima facie distinctive mark can still pass the distinctiveness hurdle if factual distinctiveness can be demonstrated. Under s 41, this operates differently according to whether the mark is classified as NSIA or NTAEIA under the first step of the distinctiveness enquiry. For NTAEIA marks, only one factor can be taken into account in assessing whether the mark does distinguish the applicant's goods or services: the extent of the applicant or predecessor in title's pre-filing date use of the mark. For NSIA marks, the second step involves a consideration of the combined effect of three factors-the degree of the mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish, the applicant or predecessor in title's use or intended use of the mark, and 'any other circumstances'-as part of an overall determination of whether the mark has or will come to distinguish the applicant's goods or services. This demonstrates how important it is for decisionmakers to explain the extent of a mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish. As was recently confirmed in Sports Warehouse, the lesser the extent of the NSIA mark's inherent adaptation to distinguish, the stronger the evidence of use or intended use will be needed for the mark to be taken to be capable of distinguishing, and vice versa.
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The key element common to both NSIA and NTAEIA marks is that of use of the mark. Much domain name 'tennis-warehouse.com', advertisements in magazines, and limited sales in Australia-this was thought to be insufficient to satisfy the former s 41(5). 109 Evidence that did not assist the applicant was that from 2003 the words 'Tennis Warehouse' had been used in conjunction with a 'TW' logo, which diluted the words' trade mark significance, and that some of the examples of use, including on promotional gifts, post-purchase invoices and post-purchase packaging, was not 'in the course of trade' and therefore not as a trade mark at all. 110 In Phone Directories v Telstra, Murphy J thought that if YELLOW were to be classified as an NSIA mark (that is, that it was inherently adapted to distinguish to a 'minor extent' 111 descriptively rather than as a trade mark, 114 or used in combination with other more distinctive matter (such as other words or a device).
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In both Phone Directories v Telstra and Sports Warehouse the judges emphasised that little evidence was provided by the applicants for registration as to consumer recognition of the marks.
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This was a particular problem for Telstra: notwithstanding evidence that it had spent close to $20 million on its 'Yellow' rebranding, the fact that it could only point to negligible evidence of consumer recognition of the 'Yellow' brand was a significant limitation. 117 This raises questions as to whether applicants might need to do more to acquire and present consumer-based evidence, and what are some of the difficulties in doing so, an issue to which I return in Part 6.
As a final point, it needs to be asked whether the recent amendment to s 41 is likely to make it easier for owners of NSIA and NTAEIA marks to secure registration. Under s 41(5) and (6) as originally enacted, the decision-maker needed to be satisfied, on the basis of the evidence provided, that the mark was or would become factually distinctive. This was thought to create uncertainty and significant costs for applicants, who felt they had little guidance as to the quality and quantity of evidence that would be needed to persuade examiners that their marks had acquired distinctiveness, particularly in the event that a response to an adverse report involving the filing of evidence led to the maintenance of the s 41 objection. From the perspective of the Office, given that much of the evidence examiners were required to assess went to quantitative measures such as the duration of use, the geographical extent of use, turnover figures and advertising expenditure (rather than evidence of consumer recognition), it might well have been the case that officials felt as if they were on somewhat shaky ground when concluding that a mark had acquired distinctiveness. These factors help explain the amendment to s 41 to ensure that the 'presumption of registrability' now applies in relation to NSIA and NTAEIA marks-it is now the case under s 41(2)-(4) that decisionmakers have to be satisfied that the marks are not or would not become factually distinctive for the s 41 ground of rejection to apply. It might be the case that the Office will internalise this change to ensure that quantitative evidence of factual distinctiveness is treated more favourably than under the former law, which is perhaps the real intention of the amendment.
However, it needs to be recognised that the application of a 'presumption' in favour of the applicant in this situation ought to make next to no practical difference. This is because under both the former and current law the decision-maker was and is required to make the assessment of factual distinctiveness on the balance of probabilities (and not on some higher standard, such as whether the mark should clearly not be registered 118 ). Because of the application of the balance of probabilities standard, it is only in cases where the evidence as to whether a mark has acquired sufficient distinctiveness can be said to be in the balance that the presumption might have any work to do. Such cases will be extremely rare, even if one adopts a 'subjectively perceived tie' approach to the balance of probabilities standard (that is, even if the evidence in fact generates a probability of slightly more or slightly less than 50% 119 ). Instead of relying on the fig leaf of the presumption of registrability, which cannot do the work the Office and many mark owners would probably like it to do, more thought needs to be given to the real difficulties involved in assessing factual distinctiveness and the challenges faced by both applicants and the Office. applies when assessing factual distinctiveness will do little, if anything, to address these problems.
Section 41 remains very difficult to interpret, and the policy or policies sought to be served by the provision are not clearly reflected in its wording. The tests used to determine a mark's 'inherent adaptation to distinguish' do not easily map on to the statutory language. Any reform of s 41 must start with simplifying the text of the provision.
Yet perhaps the most concerning issue with s 41 relates to its 'tripartite' structure-in particular the requirement that non-prima facie distinctive marks be classified as either NSIA or NTAEIA. In particular, it is not at all clear why NSIA marks should be allowed to be registered on the basis of a likelihood that they will become factually distinctive. registration, thus limiting the signs available for other traders to use for the sake of their ordinary meanings but without any clear countervailing benefit to consumers. This is especially problematic given that there no longer appears to be a solid basis for challenging the registration of such marks on the grounds that, post-registration, they have not in fact come to acquire distinctiveness.
There have, in fact, never been strong justifications for allowing the registration of non-prima facie distinctive marks that are not, but are likely to become, factually distinctive. ensure that the registration of an NSIA mark that was accepted for registration only on the basis that it would acquire distinctiveness can be cancelled after it has been registered for a period of time if it has not in fact come to acquire distinctiveness by that time.
(b) Registering descriptive marks
As a final point, it is worth briefly considering what an owner of a descriptive word mark might be able to do to increase its chances of securing protection for its mark. Without suggesting in any way that recent Australian cases and decisions on factual distinctiveness have set the bar at an inappropriate level, these cases have demonstrated that it is difficult to secure registration in Australia on the basis of factual distinctiveness, even for marks that fall to be considered as NSIA, rather than NTAEIA.
Most practitioners would be well aware of some of the strategies that can be used in order to try to overcome such objections. For NSIA marks, these might include extending the time for acceptance for as long as possible, so that more evidence of post filing date use can be amassed. For marks initially classified as NTAEIA, there is much to be gained by attempting to argue that the mark has a 'spark' or 'scintilla' of inherent adaptation (relying on Office decisions that have used this language), such that the mark should be treated as NSIA rather than NTAEIA. If this fails, a further tactic might be to make a later application for the same mark with the same specification, so that use of the mark up to the second filing date can be taken into account. The relatively minor cost involved in making the second application and the loss of the earlier priority date might well be outweighed by the ability to register the mark.
In terms of the evidence that might be relied on to show factual distinctiveness, given that the overarching question is whether or not the mark does or will distinguish the specified goods or services, surveys would seem to be the most valuable form of evidence that an applicant could adduce to show factual distinctiveness. 131 However, it is appreciated that not only are surveys costly and time-consuming to produce, but also that the Office has shown a strong degree of scepticism towards survey evidence. At times, this has been entirely understandable. The Office has been rightly critical of surveys conducted well after the relevant time for assessing whether the mark had acquired distinctiveness, 132 and surveys involving leading questions 133 or questions not eliciting responses going to whether the sign was understood by consumers as a trade mark. 134 Having said that, certain criticisms, such as those going to what might appear to be low sample sizes of surveys, have arguably been misplaced. 135 More could be done to ensure that applicants have clearer guidelines as to the sort of survey evidence that is likely to be persuasive. 136 In 'Thredbo') show how difficult such a task is likely to be. But one alternative that should not be so easily dismissed might be to seek to register a device mark prominently featuring the descriptive word mark component. Such marks will almost always be considered to have a higher degree of inherent adaptation than the word mark alone. To use an illustration from recent case law, while the word mark TENNIS WAREHOUSE for the online retailing of tennis clothing and equipment was considered to be NSIA, with a relatively low level of inherent adaptation to distinguish, 140 the following mark for 'retailing of goods (by any means)' was held to be prima facie distinctive: 141 In terms of the scope of protection afforded to such device marks, it might be thought that a mark owner would struggle to prevent another party from using only the descriptive word component of the mark, even if that party's use constitutes use as a trade mark. 142 There is a long line of Anglo-Australian authority that shows that courts will be slow to make a finding of 'deceptive similarity' where the similarity between the marks results from the common presence of descriptive or laudatory subject matter. 143 However, a recent case might provide some comfort to mark owners. In REA Group Ltd v Real Estate 1 Ltd, 144 the registered owner of the following device mark for real estate related goods and services (which had been held to be prima facie distinctive at the registration stage) was successful in its infringement action against a competitor using 'realestate1.com.au' as its domain name and as a heading to a sponsored link, appearing in Google search results as follows:
realEstate1.com.au www.realestate1.com.au/ Our aim is to make searching for real estate pure, simple and fast! issue, Bromberg J accepted that REA Group had acquired 'secondary meaning' in the term realestate.com.au, but emphasised that 'realestate' remained descriptive and that only small differences in the respondent's use would be needed to avoid a finding of liability. His Honour was not convinced that consumers clicking on the sponsored link would have failed to notice the '1' in the link and would have mistakenly believed they were accessing the realestate.com.au site. In this part of the decision his Honour was very much alive to concerns about giving the applicant a monopoly over descriptive language used in an online context (the applicant's complaint here being limited to the respondent's use of 'realestate1' only in conjunction with '.com.au'). However, in considering the issue of trade mark infringement, Bromberg J held that the marks were deceptively similar. This was because 'realestate.com.au' was presented as the owner's brand name, and that the respondent had taken that 'precise idea' for its mark, meaning that consumers would be inclined to note the presence of the '.com.au' suffix in both marks but, when scanning search results, would be likely to overlook the '1' in the respondent's mark. 145 Interestingly, his Honour's analysis of deceptive similarity focused very much on a comparison of the word components-it does not appear that any weight was given to the fact that the registered mark was a compound device mark.
The decision in REA Group on trade mark infringement could be explained on the basis that the court had, in considering passing off, recognised that the owner had acquired 'secondary meaning' in the term realestate.com.au, with the presence of the '.com.au' suffix being essential to this process. However, his Honour did not explicitly link the finding that the registered owner's domain name alone had acquired distinctiveness with the finding on deceptive similarity. This raises a question of how the case would have been decided in the absence of the passing off claim, and whether the court would have required the registered mark owner to demonstrate such acquired distinctiveness for deceptive similarity to be established. Valid concerns have been raised about the decision, with some commentators suggesting that it shows the need for the reintroduction of mandatory disclaimers of descriptive content in registered trade mark law. 146 My view is that a more robust application of the deceptive similarity enquiry is needed, which is more explicit about the need to ensure that owners are not given overbroad monopolies in descriptive content, and which recognises that in some situations a degree of consumer confusion needs to be tolerated in order to prioritise other valuable policy goals. For the time being, however, REA Group remains an 145 Ibid [241] , and also at [243]-[245] on the relevance of the '.com.au' suffix in both marks. His Honour was conscious of the monopoly problems of this outcome (at [247]) but addressed this concern separately from the deceptive similarity enquiry. His Honour considered that the only way of mitigating these monopoly problems would be to challenge the validity of the registered mark, which raises an interesting point about whether the distinctiveness test should be recalibrated to make it more difficult to register compound device marks containing highly descriptive word components. 146 
